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Americans are not saving:
Should we worry?
Much has been made in recent months
of the low personal saving rate in the
U.S. The rate’s drop from around
5% in the early 1990s to 0% today is
a cause of serious concern. Many take
it as a sign that the current expansion
is very fragile and about to end. The
argument runs as follows. The saving
rate is unsustainably low, and must
increase sooner or later. When it does,
consumption must go down and this
expansion will end.
Figure 1 shows the personal saving
rate. This measure is computed as
personal income less personal taxes
(i.e., disposable personal income) less
personal outlays, divided by disposable
personal income. It averaged 8% from
1959 to 1985, about 5.8% from 1985
to the end of the last recession, and
has been plunging since then. Since
April 1998, it has oscillated between
–0.2% and 0.4%. This plunge seems
exceptional, and, so the argument
goes, must soon be reversed.
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I question
the argument’s mechanical view of
saving and consumption on theoreti-
cal grounds and whether the personal
saving rate is a meaningful measure
for the purposes of this argument.
I argue that broader aggregates need
to be considered because saving can
take many forms.
The argument considered
The argument outlined above appeals
to common sense: Consumers can not
spend more than they earn, at least
in the long run, and some minimal
amount of saving seems commendable.
In the past, as figure 1 shows, that
amount of saving was reasonable. In
the present expansion, consumers
are spending with abandon, but when
they come to their senses, they will
have to halt their spend-
ing spree.
But the argument is not
self-evident, and it relies
on fairly strong assump-
tions about consumers’
behavior. The argument
does not try to explain
why the personal saving
rate is so low, but it im-
plicitly assumes that the
present level of saving is




Should we trust an argument that
presumes its proponent to be smart-
er than everyone else in the economy?
In theory, a low saving rate can arise
from perfectly rational behavior. The
usual model for thinking about sav-
ing is the permanent income model,
which derives saving behavior from
consumers’ consideration of their
known lifetime income, rather than
from current income.  If consumers
learn that their income will be high-
er than expected in the future, they
adjust their consumption to this new
level of lifetime wealth, even before
their income has increased. This
would lead to a justifiable fall in sav-
ing. Ultimately, saving will increase
when income increases, not by a reduc-
tion in consumption.
One reason consumers could expect
their future income to be higher is
an expected increase in the perfor-
mance of the economy, say, because
firms are expected to be more produc-
tive in the future. Now would be a
good time to consume, because invest-
ment (which involves the sacrifice of
consumption) will be more produc-
tive in the future. Such future improve-
ments would not be reflected in
current income, but in a higher valu-
ation of the firms. On the surface,
consumers would thus appear to be
spending “paper gains,” fooled by an
exuberant stock market. In reality,
they would have revised their expecta-
tions and acted accordingly. Of course,
consumers and markets may all be
dead wrong about the U.S. economy’s
future performance.  But the debate
becomes a matter of assessing a change
of expectations about the future.
Is this the right measure of saving?
Much attention has been paid to vari-
ous flaws in the measure plotted in
figure 1, especially after a methodolog-
ical change in the measure by the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) in August
1998. The change removed certain
forms of capital gains from income,
reducing the reported figures for in-
come but leaving the figures for per-
sonal outlays unchanged. The BEA
had good reasons for changing the
measure (treating capital gains in
a way consistent with other national
income and product accounts), but
the change suggests that the personal
saving rate may be much too narrow a
measure, focusing as it does on certain
forms of income only. Tinkering at
the edges with the BEA’s measure
is not enough. Rather than debate
what items should be included in or
excluded from the BEA’s measure of
percent of disposable income
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percent of net domestic product
Note: Quarterly data. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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come) back to firms
(as saving). Under both
arrangements, house-
holds save just as much
but, under the latter,




saving, there is “corpo-
rate saving,” but since
it is done on behalf of
households, there
is no reason to separate
it from personal saving.
If we consider total pri-
vate saving, that is, per-
sonal saving plus
corporate saving,1 we arrive at the lev-




during the last expan-
sion was quite different,
remaining roughly sta-
ble at 6% from 1985 to
1997. Only in the last
year and a half has it
fallen markedly.
We can also look at
total U.S. saving, by add-
ing private and public
saving (net of capital
consumption; the pat-
terns are the same if
one looks at gross sav-
ing). The results are shown in figure 3.
The (net) national saving rate, which
had been falling steadily since the
late 1960s, bottomed
out in the third quarter
of 1992 at 2.4% and has
risen steadily since then
to 7.4%.
The difference in be-
havior, of course, is
traceable to govern-
ment saving, which had
been mostly negative
since the first oil shock
in 1973. Since the third
quarter of 1992, govern-
ment saving (federal,
state, and local) has
moved from –3.9% to
3.2% of gross national
product. Government
saving tends to be
procyclical, since revenues shrink and
expenditures increase during reces-
sions, but the recent increase in gov-
ernment finances is unprecedented.
Why is the personal saving rate so low?
Figure 4 shows the disposition of per-
sonal income, broken down into
three categories: outlays, taxes, and
savings. The widely cited personal
saving rate that just turned negative
can be inferred from the figure: It is
the ratio of saving to outlays plus sav-
ing. Figure 4 shows that while images
of Americans raiding the piggy bank
to fuel a consumption binge might
make good copy, they are at least
partly incorrect. Personal outlays take
a larger share of income, but so do
taxes. Figure 4 also gives more insight
into the paradox of a lower personal
saving rate coupled with a higher
national saving rate. As tax payments
are biting a larger chunk of their in-
come, why are households cutting
back on saving rather than spending?
Figure 3, which shows government
and private sector saving rates, sug-
gests an answer. Consumers are letting
government do their saving for them,
the same way they are letting business-
es do it as shown above. In other words,
consumers look at the taxes they are
paying now as partly an investment,
which will pay off in the future, in the
form of lower taxes or higher benefits
from the government. If that is the case,
then a fall in taxes now would result,
not in higher consumption but in a
higher saving rate, as consumers
would resume saving for themselves
instead of through the government.
personal saving, I argue that it is nec-
essary to consider broader aggregates.
To better understand this, we can
divide the economy into the private
sector and the public sector (govern-
ment). The private sector, in the na-
tional accounts, is subdivided into
households and (privately owned)
businesses. But that distinction is arti-
ficial because households ultimately
own the firms. For the subject at hand,
the exact timing and arrangement of
flows between firms and households
is of little importance. In one arrange-
ment, firms produce and turn over
revenue to households as wages and
dividends. Households then make
saving decisions and turn over their
savings to firms for investment. In
another arrangement, firms make the
saving decision for the households
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Note: Quarterly data. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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5. Domestic investment and saving
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the 1980s. The invest-
ment rate has steadily
increased from a post-
World War II low of
12.2% in the second
quarter of 1990 to a
current rate of 16.1%,
slightly above the
post-World War II
mean of 15.6%. How
is domestic invest-
ment financed? In
accounting terms, it is
saving less net foreign
investment. As figure
5 shows, in recent
years saving has been
less than domestic investment. In
other words, net foreign investment
has been negative, because we spend
some of our saving to finance our
trade deficit. The overall pattern,
however, is the same.
Should we worry about this long-
term downward trend? It depends
on what explains it. The rates plot-
ted in figure 5 are really budget
shares, and budget shares do not tell
the complete story. I may be spend-
ing less of my income on apples and
still be buying more apples than
before, if the price of apples has fall-
en enough.
In fact, as shown in the left panel of
figure 6, the relative price of invest-
ment goods has fallen markedly. In-
vestment goods are becoming
cheaper, and expenditures on invest-
ment goods (which is the investment
rate) are declining as a share of total
An interesting implication of this
argument is that a cut in taxes would
reverse the trend in the personal sav-
ing rate and let consumers do the sav-
ing for themselves, something which
may or may not be desirable in the
context of the Social Security debate.
But a tax cut would do little to alter
consumption behavior.
Reasons to worry?
There are reasons to worry about the
saving rate in general. Investment is,
by and large, financed by saving, and
an economy needs to invest in order
to maintain and expand its capital
stock. Are we investing too little in
the U.S.? Figure 5 shows the share of
gross domestic product that is taken
by gross domestic investment.
Like figure 3, figure 5 displays a down-
ward trend over the past 50 years,
although, interestingly, the current
income. This is not a sign that, as a
nation, we are saving less and building
fewer factories, but rather, that it is
costing us less to build the same num-
ber of factories. The right panel of fig-
ure 6 confirms that, when one looks at
quantities, consumption and invest-
ment have been following the same
secular growth trend. And, if anything,
this allegedly “consumer-driven”
expansion seems to be as much about
investment.
Conclusion
There appear to be good reasons not
to worry about the saving rate. Once
the appropriate aggregates are consid-
ered, this expansion does not appear
to be out of line with past experience.
The reason for considering these
aggregates is that saving can be carried
out on behalf of consumers by firms
and government. And, in fact, it is—
something to bear in mind in any dis-
cussion of fiscal policy as a means to
boost consumption. Finally, the long-
term downward trend in the national
saving rate need not be worrisome if




1This includes undistributed corporate
profits, inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments, and wage
accruals less disbursements.